From Commodity Chains to Value Chains: Interdisciplinary Theory Building in an Age of Globalization by Sturgeon, Timothy J.
 
 
 
 
INDUSTRY STUDIES ASSOCATION 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
From Commodity Chains to Value Chains: 
Interdisciplinary Theory Building in an Age of Globalization 
 
From Frontiers Of Commodity Chain Research By Jennifer Bair, (C) 2008 by the Board of Trustees of the  
Leland Stanford Jr. University, All Rights Reserved. By permission of Stanford University Press.  
No further reproduction, copy or transmission of this material may be made without written permission from the publisher, www.sup.org. 
 
By 
 
Timothy J. Sturgeon 
Industrial Performance Center 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Cambridge, MA 02139 
and 
Institute for Technology, Enterprise, and Competitiveness 
Doshisha School of Management 
Kyoto, Japan 602-8580 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 
Industry Studies Association 
Working Papers 
 
WP-2008-02 
http://isapapers.pitt.edu/ 
 1 
Chapter 6 
 
From Commodity Chains to Value Chains: 
Interdisciplinary Theory Building in an Age of Globalization 
 
Timothy J. Sturgeon 
 
 
Recent changes in the global economy, especially the rise of East Asia as an economic force, 
have rendered static notions of permanent dependency and underdevelopment obsolete.1  
Regions, countries, and individual localities can improve their relative position in the global 
economy.  The much-debated question is: how?  Sound macroeconomic policy, sector-
specific industrial development policies, technological borrowing, and firm-level responses 
to the demands of overseas buyers have all been put forward as explanations and 
prescriptions for rapid industrial upgrading and economic development in East Asia and 
elsewhere.  Proponents of these different views have debated each other to a standstill, or 
have simply chosen to talk past each other.  Could it be that there is no single explanation for 
why places advance, or fail to advance in the global economy, and that unitary explanations 
will always fall short?   
 
The specificities of technology, industry, society, and historical moment all have the 
potential of being decisive in shaping individual and aggregate outcomes for places, firms, 
and workers.  As a result, the variety that can be observed in the global economy is 
effectively infinite.  Given the great complexity that exists in economic systems, any theory 
that is meant to explain and predict outcomes for entire industries, countries, regions, or the 
                                                      
1 This chapter was supported by Doshisha University’s ITEC 21st Century COE (Centre of Excellence) 
Program’s Synthetic Studies on Technology, Enterprise and Competitiveness Project.  Participants in the Global 
Value Chains Initiative contributed to the development of the concepts advanced, especially Hubert Schmitz, 
Peter Gibbon, Florence Palpaceur, Raphie Kaplinsky, Mike Morris, Meenu Tewari, and Katherine McFate.  
John Talbot, Richard Applebaum, Rachel Schurman, Sanjaya Lall, William Millberg, and Andrew Schrank 
provided useful feedback during a workshop held at Yale University on May 13 and 14, 2005.  Jennifer Bair, 
Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey and two anonymous reviewers provided helpful editorial suggestions on an 
earlier draft. All responsibility for the final text, or course, lies with the author. 
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global economy as a whole should be treated as highly suspect, at best.  Because multiple 
forces of change are always at play, theory, if used in a totalizing manner, can obscure as 
much as it reveals.  But complexity should not lead to the abandonment of theory, or to the 
development of theories that are so inclusive and flexible that they fail to provide any 
traction.  
 
It is better, in my view, to develop discrete theoretical areas to deal with specific questions. A 
theory with a modest and clearly defined explanatory scope, one that identifies one or a few 
important causal mechanisms that can be used to partially explain and predict outcomes, can 
have great utility.  What is important is to recognize the limits inherent in such partial 
theories and to actively seek compatibility and linkages with complimentary frameworks.  
Not least, this “modular” approach to theory building is useful for researchers because it 
directs them to a manageable set of questions that can be tested in the field or applied to 
specific policy problems. But because of the great variety of causal forces at work in the 
global economy, it is incumbent upon those who develop and apply fractional theories to 
policy and strategy to be cautious, and to actively consider alternative explanations and 
approaches. 
 
The need for serviceable theory is great.  The global economy has entered a new phase of 
deeper, more immediate integration that is exposing national and local economies to the 
winds of economic change as never before. These winds can fill the sails of domestic firms 
and industries, blow them away, or perhaps even worse, bypass them entirely. The 
geographer Peter Dicken (1992) argues that it is the functional integration of internationally 
dispersed activities that differentiates the current era of  ‘globalization’ from an earlier era of 
‘internationalization,’ which was characterized by the simple geographic spread of economic 
activities across national boundaries. Functional integration has come with tighter 
coordination within an expanding set of multinational firms (Zanfei, 2000), but also with the 
rise of firms in the West — retailers and branded merchandisers with little or no internal 
production (Gereffi, 1994; Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006) and de-verticalizing 
“manufacturers” that have shed internal capacity — that have come to rely on an emergent 
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set of global and East Asian regional contract manufacturers for production (Borrus et al, 
2000; Sturgeon, 2002). 
 
Nor is the situation static.  It is worth highlighting two recent developments that are enabling 
even greater functional integration in the global economy: 1) rapidly increasing industrial 
capabilities in developing countries, especially in China and India, and 2) new computer-
mediated approaches to real-time integration of distant activities. These new features 
facilitate international trade in many intermediate goods and services that have not previously 
been sent across borders. As a result, opportunities have opened up for firms to engage with 
the global economy — as buyers, suppliers, sellers, distributors, contractors, and service 
providers — in ways that were impossible even a few years ago. These changes have created 
new challenges and risks, as well as opportunities. Because activities are being integrated in 
the global economy at a very granular level, pressure has increased for firms and individual 
workers that may have been insulated from global competition in the past.  The result is 
accelerating change and an increased sense of economic insecurity, even among the 
“winners” in the global economy.   
 
Policymakers responsible for responding to the pressures of global integration are desperate 
for conceptual frameworks and theoretical constructs that can help to guide their work, which 
often includes making difficult trade-offs in the context of extremely complex and rapidly 
changing situations.  The so-called “Washington Consensus,” the view that countries simply 
need to get their macroeconomic house in order and be open to international trade and 
investment to advance in the global economy, provides little guidance to policy-makers and 
non-governmental activists dealing with the concerns of workers, communities, and 
industries that are in the midst of wrenching change or which remain completely severed 
from the global economy.  The need for pragmatism motivates theories characterized by 
simplicity, easy applicability in the face of variety, and resonance with real world situations.   
 
In the fall of 2000, a group of academic researchers with deep experience in field-based 
observation of cross-border production in a range of industries began to meet in a series of 
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workshops to develop a theory of governance for what we eventually chose to call ‘global 
value chains’ (GVCs) .2  The participants hailed from a variety of countries and disciplines, 
including sociology, economics, geography, regional planning, political science, 
management, and development studies.  This joint work continued to be developed through 
2004 in the context of four multi-day workshops, several smaller meetings, and an ongoing 
dialogue and collaborative writing effort by core members of the group.   
 
An important goal was to develop a theory that could help policymakers explain and predict 
governance patterns in cross-border production networks.  With such tools in hand, our 
thinking went, interventions aimed at upgrading the position of local workers, firms and 
industries within global-scale production systems could be more finely crafted and effective.  
Each workshop included policy-makers and activists from non-governmental organizations 
who voiced their concerns and provided feedback on the utility of our ideas as they 
developed in various iterations. Because of the policy orientation of this work, our goal was 
to create a relatively simple theoretical model that was robust, relevant, and easily applicable 
to real-world situations.  At the same time, we recognized the need to ground the theory in 
the existing academic literature to help build consensus among researchers.  Our strategy was 
to set a virtuous cycle in motion where a growing, relatively coherent body of scholarly 
research would build academic legitimacy that would in turn embolden practitioners to apply 
non-standard concepts in the field to help solve real-world policy problems. 
 
                                                      
2 This group met under the auspices of the “Global Value Chains Initiative,” sponsored largely by the 
Rockefeller Foundation (a meeting held in Rockport, Massachusetts in April 2004 was sponsored by the Alfred 
P. Sloan Foundation).  The participants in the first workshop, a seven-day event held at the Rockefeller 
conference center in Bellagio, Italy, were Catherine Dolan (UK), Peter Gibbon (Denmark), Gary Gereffi (USA), 
Afonso Fleury (Brazil), John Humphrey (UK), Raphie Kaplinsky (UK), Ji-Ren Lee (Taiwan), Dorothy 
McCormick (Kenya), Katherine McFate (USA), Mike Morris (South Africa), Florence Palpaceur (France), 
Hubert Schmitz (UK), and Meenu Tewari (USA).  Subsequent workshops included many of these core 
participants, additional academics researchers, as well as policymakers and NGO activists from United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Trade 
Organization’s International Trade Centre, the World Bank’s Development Economics Research Group, the 
International Labour Organization’s World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, the 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, the AFL-CIO, Oxfam, India’s National Council of 
Applied Economic Research, the Merrimack Valley (Massachusetts) Workforce Investment Board, and the 
Maquila Solidarity Network/Ethical Trading Action Group. 
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The first output from this work was contained in a special issue of the Institute for 
Development Studies Bulletin (32:2) entitled “ The Value of Value Chains: Spreading the 
Gains from Globalisation,” which appeared in July 2001.  This volume is comprised of 
articles written by several of the core participants of what came to be known as the “Global 
Value Chains Initiative.”  The articles summarize the nascent ideas developed by the group 
in the areas of GVC terminology, chain governance, and industrial upgrading.  The volume 
also includes several articles that applied some of the new thinking to case studies.  The work 
on firm-level governance was our initial focus, but other strands of work developed, and 
continue to be developed today, including theoretical work on standards, industrial 
upgrading, labor, the development of GVC metrics, and a robust stream of field research.  
Out of this work has come a stream of peer-reviewed publications, a large body of policy-
related consulting reports, the development of methodological handbooks for policy 
practitioners, and a website to provide a single point of access to GVC-related work.3  One 
strand of this initial theoretical work, on firm-level network governance, culminated in an 
article that I wrote with Gary Gereffi and John Humphrey entitled, “The Governance of 
Global Value Chains,” which appeared in the Review of International Political Economy in 
March 2005. 
 
The limits of space in our original 2005 article, and the insights gained from subsequent 
reactions we have had to it, motivate this effort to situate, elaborate, and further explain the 
theoretical framework we developed.  First, I discuss the motivations for supplementing the 
“buyer-driven” and “producer-driven” modes of global commodity chain governance 
developed by Gary Gereffi in the 1990s with an industry-neutral, non-empirical framework.  
Second, I briefly present the features of the GVC governance framework as they appear in 
the 2005 article, and discuss its interdisciplinary theoretical underpinnings in more detail 
than was possible in the original article. Third, I discuss the problem of variation in GVC 
governance.  Fourth, I situate the GVC governance framework in a larger field of GVC-
related theory, including but not limited to power and institutions.  
                                                      
3 A list of more than 300 GVC-related publications can be found at www.globalvaluechains.org.  
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From Global Commodity Chains to Global Value Chains 
In developing our theory of GVC governance we drew on a variety of previous work that we 
felt was relevant to our project.  I will discuss these various theoretical influences later in the 
chapter, but first I will explain how the concepts evolved from its most direct progenitor, the 
“global commodity chains” (GCC) framework as developed by Gary Gereffi (1994, 1999).  
Gereffi’s framework lays out four key structures that shape GCCs (input-output, geographic, 
governance, and institutional) but one, the governance structure, has received the most 
attention, both from Gereffi and his immediate co-authors and from the many others that 
have made use of his framework.   
 
The GCC concept was first developed by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1977, 1986) who 
highlighted the power of the state in shaping global production systems, exercised in large 
part in the form of tariffs and local content rules affected at the point where goods crossed 
borders (see also Wallerstein in this volume).  Gereffi (1994) revived the GCC concept by 
refocusing it on the strategies and actions of firms, in part because of the restricted ability of 
states to set tariffs and local content rules in the context of trade liberalization.  But trade 
openness does not in itself create industrial capabilities. Liberalization has enabled the 
growth of international trade, but without the push from advanced-economy firms seeking to 
tap capabilities and markets in developing countries, the cross-border flows of goods and 
services would surely be more modest, in terms of both total volume and technological 
content, than they are today. Because firms from advanced economies have done so much to 
create capabilities in developing countries, they continue to control and guide many of the 
key industrial resources in the global economy, even those they do not own. 
 
The “governance” function within Gereffi’s GCC framework captured variation in the way 
that firms organized their cross-border production arrangements.  Specifically, the GCC 
framework contained a key distinction between global chains that are "driven" by two kinds 
of lead firms: buyers and producers.  Gereffi’s producer-driven variant can be equated with 
the internal and external networks emanating from large multinational manufacturing firms, 
such as General Motors and IBM.  Multinational firms have long been a focus of research 
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and debate among scholars of the global economy (e.g., Vernon, 1966, 1971, 1979; Caves 
1996).  This work examined and debated the methods, timing, and motivations of 
multinational firms and the degree that they acted as conduits for the transfer of capabilities 
from developed to developing countries.  Gereffi’s framework focused attention on a new set 
of Western-based actors, and the roles they play in driving capability development, especially 
in East Asia.  The “buyer-driven” GCC variant focused attention on the powerful role that 
large retailers, such as JC Penny, Sears, and later, Wal-Mart, as well as highly successful 
branded merchandisers, such as Nike and Liz Claiborne, have come to play in the governance 
of global production and distribution.  
 
“Global buyers” do more than place orders; they actively help to create, shape, and 
coordinate the global value chains that supply their products, sometimes directly from 
“overseas buying offices” and sometimes through intermediaries, which include a wide range 
of actors, most notably trading companies based in Hong Kong, Korea, and Japan.  While 
they typically own few, if any, of their own factories, the volume of their purchases affords 
global buyers a huge amount of power over their suppliers, which they sometimes use to 
specify in great detail what, how, when, where, and by whom the goods they sell are 
produced. But even when explicit coordination is not present, extreme market power has 
allowed global buyers to extract price concessions from their main suppliers.  Suppliers have 
responded by locating more of their factories in low-cost locations and working hard to 
extract price concessions from their own workers and upstream suppliers.4  
 
Why are commodity chains buyer- or producer-driven? Gereffi did not explore this question 
in detail, but instead let the empirical evidence speak for itself: capital and technology 
intensive industries such as electronics and autos tend to be governed by producers, while 
                                                      
4 Feenstra and Hamilton (2006) describe, in detail, the ways in which retailers gained power relative to 
manufacturers, beginning in the United States in the 1960s, a trend that continues to the present day.  On one 
hand this ‘retail revolution’ has been a major factor in de-industrialization within the United States, as retailers 
increased overseas sourcing of apparel, electronics and consumer goods, in turn forcing manufacturers to move 
their own facilities offshore and increase sourcing in low cost locations in East Asia. The other side of this coin 
was the spurring of “late” industrialization and industrial upgrading, first in Japan, and later in Korea and 
Taiwan (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990; Evans, 1995). 
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labor intensive industries such as apparel and consumer goods tend to be governed by buyers. 
But how is the level of capital intensity in an industry related to its governance form?  
Because innovation in buyer-driven GCCs lies more in product design and marketing than in 
manufacturing know-how, it is relatively easy for lead firms to outsource the manufacturing 
of labor-intensive products. In the more technology- and capital-intensive items made in 
producer-driven chains, technology and production expertise were core competencies that 
needed to be developed and deployed in-house, or in closely affiliated ‘captive’ suppliers that 
can be blocked from sharing them with competitors.   
 
In our group, we discussed how these variables played out in the context of recent field 
research findings in both buyer- and producer-driven chains, and found it to be increasingly 
difficult to assign these characteristics to specific industries in a static way, as the GCC 
framework does. The intense interest in Gereffi’s framework, and especially the “buyer-
driven” commodity chain type, underscored the appetite for an industry-independent, firm-
level theory of production network governance.  The shift in focus from the state to the actors 
in the chain, and their interrelationships, and especially to the relative power that some firms 
are able to exert on the actions and capabilities of their affiliates and trading partners, was 
immediately accepted and put to use by both practitioners and researchers because it 
reflected and helped to explain several of the most novel features of the global economy.   
 
Nevertheless, as we discussed our own recent research findings, as well as the findings of 
others (Feenstra, 1998; Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001), we detected a shift in the organization 
of global production toward external networks.  An outsourcing wave was breaking over 
producer-driven chains, and as a result “manufacturers” in producer-driven chains were 
becoming more buyer-like. Deverticalization was being driven, not only by the rise of 
powerful retailers, but later, in the 1990s, by a broader effort on the part of branded 
manufacturing firms to increase shareholder value by shifting fixed assets (like factories) and 
risk to suppliers—both to an emergent set of “global suppliers” based in the US and Europe 
(Fold, 2001; Sturgeon, 2002; Humphrey, 2003) and to local suppliers in East Asia that could 
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meet, or be taught to meet the required specifications and use the right process technologies 
and procedures (Gereffi, 1999; Lee and Chen, 2000).  
 
Furthermore, what could and could not be transferred to suppliers proved to be a moving 
target as better codification schemes developed and the capabilities in the supply-base 
improved over time.  The new digital tools supporting global-scale functional integration 
were being deployed in a wide range of industries, labor- and capital-intensive alike.  For us, 
it was clear that changes in the governance of cross-border production arrangements that 
were being observed in the field demanded more network types than buyer-driven.  
Specifically, we perceived four new features in the governance of global-scale economic 
activity that stimulated us to re-conceptualize the key variables in cross-border chain 
governance: 
1) Improvements in information technology and industry-level standards that enable 
the codification of complex information, which were easing the way for network 
forms of organization in technology-intensive industries (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000; Balconi, 2002). 
2) Flexible capital equipment that was enabling technology- and capital-intensive 
production equipment to be pooled in the same way that labor intensive 
production can be pooled, again easing the way for network forms of organization 
in technology-intensive industries (Brusoni and Principe, 2001; Langlois, 2003). 
3) Sophisticated supply-chain management tools that were pushing labor-intensive 
industries up the technology curve (Abernathy et al, 1999). 
4) Increased outsourcing by manufacturing firms, and increased involvement in 
product definition by retailers (private label) were blurring any clear distinction 
between buyers and producers.  
 
To sum up, the buyer- and producer-driven GCC typology was based on a static, empirically 
situated view of technology and barriers to entry, but both are dynamic because of 
technological change and firm- and industry-level learning (Henderson et al, 2002; Ponte and 
Gibbon, 2005).  As we adopted a more dynamic view of chain governance two things 
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became clear: 1) there was a clear shift away from the vertically integrated, producer-driven 
variant in a range of industries, and 2) the buyer-driven type could not characterize all of the 
network types being observed in the field.  We also chose to replace the term “commodity” 
with “value” because of popular connotations of the word “commodity” with undifferentiated 
products, especially primary products such as crude oil and bulk agricultural goods, and 
because the term “value” captured both the concept of “value added,” which fit well with the 
chain metaphor we were using, and focused attention on the main source of economic 
development: the application of human effort, often amplified by machines, to generate 
returns on invested capital. 
The (firm-level) governance of global value chains 
In moving beyond the empirically based typology of chain governance developed in the GCC 
stream, our goal was to construct a dynamic, operational theory that could account for 
observed changes and anticipate future developments. Our first step was to ask three 
questions of case material collected from a range of global industries: 1) what activities are 
bundled in one node of the chain or split among various nodes; 2) how is knowledge, 
information, and material passed from one node to the next; and 3) where are the nodes 
located?  One of our greatest challenges was to overcome the specific language that most 
case studies use to discuss these features (see Sturgeon, 2000, for an early attempt to develop 
industry-neutral terminology).  From this comparison, we were able to identify five generic 
ways that firms coordinate, or ‘govern’ the linkages between value chain activities: 1) simple 
market linkages, governed by price; 2) modular linkages, where complex information 
regarding the transaction is codified and often digitized before being passed to highly 
competent suppliers; 3) relational linkages, where tacit information is exchanged between 
buyers and highly competent suppliers; 4) captive linkages, where less competent suppliers 
are provided with detailed instructions; and 5) linkages within the same firm, governed by 
management hierarchy. We found that these five linkage patterns could be associated with 
predictable combinations of three distinct variables: the complexity of information exchanged 
between value chain tasks; the codifiability of that information; and the capabilities resident 
in the supply base (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. The Global Value Chains Framework 
Key Variable 
 
Governance 
Type 
Complexity of 
transactions 
Ability to codify 
transactions 
Capabilities in 
the supply-base 
 
Degree of explicit 
coordination and 
power asymmetry 
Market Low High High 
Modular High High High 
Relational High Low High 
Captive High High Low 
Hierarchy High Low Low 
Low 
 
 
 
High 
Note:  There are eight possible combinations of the three variables. Five of them generate global 
value chain types. The combination of low complexity of transactions and low ability to 
codify is unlikely to occur. This excludes two combinations. If the complexity of the 
transaction is low and the ability to codify is high, then low supplier capability would lead to 
exclusion from the value chain. While this is an important outcome, it does not generate a 
governance type per se. 
Source: Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005; as adapted by Dicken, 2007, p. 158. 
 
This “GVC governance” framework helped us to explain why some value chain activities are 
firmly rooted in place and some are more easily relocated.  Specifically, modular GVC 
linkages raise the potential for tight coordination of distant activities, even when complexity 
is high, while relational linkages typically require co-location to support the exchange of tacit 
information, driving co-location, agglomeration, and industrial clustering. Furthermore, we 
found that changes in one or more of the three variables altered value chain governance 
patterns in predictable ways. For example, if a new technology rendered an established 
codification scheme obsolete, or was overwhelmed by increasing complexity, modular value 
chains became more relational.  If competent suppliers could not be found, then captive 
networks and even vertical integration became more prevalent. Conversely, rising supplier 
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competence tended to push captive governance more toward the relational type and better 
codification schemes prepared the ground for modular governance. 
The theoretical underpinnings of the GVC governance framework 
As already mentioned, our approach to constructing a theory of GVC governance was to 
draw from the existing literature on inter-firm governance and industrial organization to the 
greatest extent possible.  Several important categories of governance have been developed 
and debated in the literature over the course of many decades.  The first question, asked by 
Ronald Coase (1937), was why the market did not govern all transactions?  In other words, 
why are some business activities bundled within firms?  Williamson (1975) built a theoretical 
framework around the answer provided by Coase, that there were sometimes costs to 
transacting that could be reduced when activities were brought inside of the firm to be 
governed, not by relative prices, but directly by the firm’s internal management “hierarchy.”  
The key variable in transaction costs economics is asset specificity: relationship-specific 
investments that tend to lock business partners into their relationships, creating opportunities 
for either party to take advantage of the other.  The dynamic outcome is that the buying firm 
would eventually internalize the function, to avoid being taken advantage of, because asset 
specificity tends to increase over the life of an inter-firm relationship (Williamson, 1981). 
Williamson eventually noted the prevalence of network forms of organization where there is 
some form of explicit coordination beyond simple market transactions but which fall short of 
vertical integration, and acknowledged networks as an intermediate organizational form 
(Williamson, 1985). 
 
Granovetter (1985) disagrees with the opportunistic view of human nature underpinning 
transaction cost economics.  His view is that economic activity is embedded in social 
relationships, not the other way round, and that trust and even goodwill can and often does 
build up in the inter-personal relationships that inevitably underlie inter-firm relations.  The 
“relational” view of economic life suggests that inter-firm relationships can be sustained in 
the face of asset specificity.  The stream of work that explored this question (Johanson and 
Matsson, 1987, 1987; Lorenz, 1988; Jarillo, 1988; Powell, 1987, 1990) drew on the work of 
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Granovetter, as well as the example of Italian ‘industrial districts’ provided by Piore and 
Sabel (1984), to argue for a distinct “network” form of industrial organization, based on trust, 
long-term relationships, social and spatial proximity, and the desire for repeat business on the 
part of suppliers.   
 
Geographers, for their part, have long argued that social and spatial proximity could 
substitute for vertical integration (Scott, 1988; Storper, 1995).  For many, Adler (2001) 
provided the final word in this debate, mapping out three types of industrial organization: 
market, communitarian/trust, and hierarchy.  As Bair points out in the introduction to this 
volume, the GVC framework, by internalizing the insights of economic sociologists such as 
Granovetter, in the “relational” GVC governance form, created a connection to economic 
sociology that the GCC literature has not.  At the same time, the centrality of the concept of 
asset specificity links the GVC framework to the work of heterodox economists.  While the 
relational and Hobbsian views of economic life have typically been framed in mutually 
exclusive terms, the GVC governance framework incorporates a range of solutions to the 
problem of asset specificity. 
 
A stream of literature centered on the concept of firm capability and learning, largely from 
the field of strategic management, was also influential in our thinking about GVC 
governance. This literature assumes that firms compete on the basis of internal “resources” 
that take time to develop (Penrose, 1959).   Because firm-level competencies can be scarce 
and difficult to replicate, it may be impossible for lead firms to internalize functions or find 
substitute suppliers in time to compete effectively.  Related ideas have been developed by a 
series of scholars from the evolutionary economics school, launched by Nelson and Winter 
(1982), to the “resource view of the firm” developed by Barney (1991), to examinations of 
firm-level “dynamic capabilities” (Teece et al, 1997), to more recent work on “industry 
architectures,” meant to reconcile the transaction cost and capabilities explanations for 
industry organization (Jacobedies and Winter, 2005).  The capabilities literature identifies 
access to expertise and competencies as ample motivation for forging and maintaining 
external relationships, even when asset specificity is significant. This pragmatic view of 
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industry organization provides an antidote to the mechanistic, immediate, frictionless view of 
organizational change contained in the transactions cost framework.5  
 
Our approach was to combine the key insights from these different streams of literature.  
First, we recognized asset specificity as a potential hazard in inter-firm relationships.  This 
resonated with our field research, where we learned that managers commonly valued the 
ability to switch suppliers when conditions dictated.  But we also found that many companies 
had developed a tolerance for sustained relationships with other firms in the face of asset 
specificity.  Finally, we observed firms exchanging extremely complex information in 
codified form, often using advanced information technology, and learned that lead firms 
could choose among an elite but growing set of suppliers and contract manufacturers that had 
sufficient capability to receive the information and act on it appropriately.  In all, we 
perceived three network forms situated between markets and hierarchies.  The first, and most 
“hierarchy like,” was for lead firms to dominate their supplier’s business to the point where 
they were unlikely to act in opportunistic ways (the captive governance form).  The second 
was for buyers and suppliers to maintain relationships in the face of asset specificity, either 
by building up mutual trust, or by simply tolerating it out of necessity because of the barriers 
to easy internalization created by learning or scale (the relational governance form). The third 
was for buyers and suppliers to reduce asset specificity by passing information in codified 
form, according to open standards, while keeping tacit knowledge contained within each firm 
(the modular form).   
 
A view of where the “network” form of industrial organization resides in the industrial 
organization and GCC/GVC literatures is provided by Table 1, which shows the three GVC 
governance forms as a tripartite elaboration of the single inter-firm governance form 
variously described as intermediate, network, community/trust, and buyer-driven by different 
streams of literature.  The variation in transaction costs economics is dynamic, but 
                                                      
5 Of course, a second variable in the transactions cost framework, frequency of transactions, acknowledges that 
asset specific activities tend to remain outsourced when minimum scale economies cannot be reached through 
internal consumption, a notion that was developed separately in a classic article by Richardson (1975). 
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unidirectional, tilted toward vertical integration because of the tendency for asset specificity 
to build up in inter-firm relationships over time (Williamson, 1981). Williamson’s (1985) 
acknowledgement of an “intermediate” form between markets and hierarchies, along with 
subsequent literature on “network” and “communitarian/trust” forms of industrial 
organization (Powell, 1990; Adler, 2001) did much to establish a third, distinct mode of 
industrial organization6. In the GCC framework (Gereffi, 1994), producer-driven chains are 
comprised of vertically integrated firms and their captive suppliers, governed largely by 
management hierarchy, or something close to it, while buyer-driven GCCs are comprised of 
linkages between independent firms, a generic network form in which coordination 
mechanisms are not specified, where retailers and branded merchandisers happen to wield a 
great deal of power.  The variation in the network and GCC literature is static: different 
forms of industry organization are assigned to specific industries but no mechanism is 
provided to explain the transformation of one form into another.  
 
The GVC governance framework contained in our 2005 article, and outlined again here, is 
not a grand theory of globalization or economic development, but a more modest theory of 
linkages, or perhaps better, a theory that seeks to explain and predict how nodes of value-
adding activity are linked in the spatial economy.  These linkages may be within the same 
firm or between firms, although the element of direct managerial control that holds sway 
within firms imbues intra-firm linkages (hierarchy) with a distinct character.  Linkages may 
be forged within the same building, across town, or across great distance.  The word “global” 
in global value chains simply signals our interest in value chains that include an element of 
vast distance.  Regional, national, and local value chains are nested firmly within global 
value chains, as we perceive them, and GVC governance theory operates equally well at any 
and all of these spatial scales. 
                                                      
6 Nevertheless, this distinction failed to penetrate the field of economics very far beyond the immediate debates 
just mentioned, and economistic accounts of the globalization process still emphasize only two options: 
market or hierarchy (e.g., Arndt and Kierzkowski, 2001). Firms either invest offshore directly (hierarchy) 
or buy goods and services from firms located offshore (markets). 
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Table 1. The evolution of the network organizational form 
 
 
 
 17 
 
Variation in GVC governance 
While the three variables in the GVC governance framework are drawn from case research, 
the five governance patterns are ideal types.  We recognize that the organizational character 
and economic geography of entire industries, or even of a single value chain, cannot be read 
from the characteristics of value chain linkages. First, the characteristics of a single link in 
the value chain cannot substitute for an in-depth analysis of how governance patterns in 
different parts of the chain are variegated and mixed, or how they change over time. Any 
value chain, and the larger networks of production and consumption they contribute to, 
contain thousands, if not millions, of individual transactions, depending on the time period 
considered and, of course, because products and services typically contain inputs with very 
different technical characteristics, not all transactions in a chain have the same character 
(Ponte and Gibbon, 2005).  Just as chains are comprised of multiple linkages, so too can they 
contain multiple governance forms.  In other words, characterizing larger amalgams of 
transactions according to one of the five ideal GVC governance types requires an assumption 
that all linkages within a chain or industry have the same character.  Such value chains do not 
exist in the real world.   
 
Second, because firms can be slow to adjust, and because of institutional differences that 
structure the norms of buyer-supplier relations, value chains can retain old linkage 
mechanisms even as the variables of complexity, codifiability, and supplier competence 
change.  As I will discuss in the following section, how fast and far firms and industries go in 
responding to changing GVC variables (to tap the potential for relocation and outsourcing 
contained in the modular form, for example) is influenced by institutional factors and relative 
firm power.  Changes in the technical factors of GVC governance help to set the parameters 
of value chain coordination; they enable change but do not determine it. 
 
As a result, what we observe in the field is a mixing of GVC governance forms within 
industries, value chains, firms, and even single establishments.  For example, a lead firm will 
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typically forge market relationships for standardized goods, modular linkages in complex 
transactions when standards for exchanging codified information exist and are widely known, 
relational linkages with select partners when complex inputs are impossible to specify in 
advance and knowledge is not easily internalized, and captive relationships when smaller 
suppliers can be provided with sufficient knowledge to provide needed inputs and, at the 
same time, dominated in order to keep that knowledge from spreading to competitors.  And, 
of course, firms must manage the value chain activities, and the linkages, that exist within 
their own organizations.  How these ideal types are constructed, mixed, and managed in 
practice is a key element of corporate strategy. In the realm of policy, as in corporate 
strategy, the ideal types generated by theory must be held up against and applied in real-
world situations.  Given the complexity of industries, and wide variation in governance 
patterns in different stages of the value chain and geographic locations, it can often be 
misleading to characterize entire industries according to a single, empirically prevalent GVC 
governance type.  While the problem of how to extrapolate the characteristics of individual 
transactions to the sectoral level is one that has yet to be solved, recent progress has been 
made.   
 
Jacobides et al (2006: 1201) offer “industry architectures” as historical, path-dependent 
“templates that emerge in a sector and circumscribe the division of labor among a set of co-
specialized firms.” Extrapolating from Teece’s (1986) model of capability development in 
dyadic inter-firm relationships, they argue convincingly that industry architectures evolve 
from the dynamic, co-evolutionary interplay between complementarity and factor mobility.  
For example, governance patterns established by early, successful movers can attain high 
levels of prevalence and stability through a combination of path dependence and network 
effects.  But here, again, we are asked to define governance patterns in industries empirically, 
and while research on the evolutionary dynamics of value chain governance in specific 
industries remains a critical and necessary step, we are left with few generic reference points, 
no industry-neutral explanatory variables or descriptive terms that allow for easy 
comparability and aggregation of results, and therefore a weak pathway to any generic, first-
pass solutions to common policy or strategy dilemmas.  
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Ponte and Gibbon (2005: 3) suggest dealing with the problem of defining industry-level 
GVC patterns by separating the concepts of “chain coordination,” to characterize the 
immediate coordination of linkages between specific segments of the chain, and “chain 
governance,” to denote the processes that structure the chain by limiting membership and 
establishing prevailing coordination mechanisms (e.g., rules, grading systems, standards).  In 
this view chains can be “governed” according to a single set of rules yet contain a variety of 
coordination mechanisms.  But the rules that “govern” industries are also myriad, variegated, 
and dynamic, and so require a concerted research effort to grasp in specific sectors.  While 
Ponte and Gibbon provide no framework for describing and explaining such differences, this 
is an important area of GVC theory building that I would gather under the heading of 
“institutional effects” (see below). 
 
 A way to assign GVC governance characteristics to larger amalgams of transactions, albeit 
imperfectly, is to view the initial link between lead firms and their largest, first tier suppliers 
(if they exist) as structuring the governance of the chain as a whole.  For example, if a lead 
firm has modular linkages with its first tier suppliers, which eases supplier switching even 
when transactions are complex, second and third tier suppliers will be forced to cope with the 
high degree of organizational and geographic flexibility that lead firms are able to extract 
from the system, even if they have relational or captive linkages with their immediate 
customers.7  In other words, the linkages that powerful firms forge with the most important 
suppliers go a long way toward setting the governance character of the entire chain.  
 
Three pillars of global value chain analysis: bringing power and 
institutions back in 
The broad thrust of GVC analysis contains more than the theory of firm-level governance 
just outlined.  As I mentioned earlier, there are numerous ongoing streams of research and 
theory-building going on under the GVC or closely related rubrics. This includes work on 
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global value chains in the primary and agro-commodity sectors, theoretically focused on the 
role of public and private standards in determining the distribution of gains from trade among 
different actors in the chain (Fold, 2002; Gibbon, 2003; Gibbon and Ponte, 2005; Ponte and 
Gibbon, 2005).  As the Talbot and Topik chapters in this volume show, the GCC stream 
remains very robust, focused largely on how institutions, especially standards and grading 
systems, tend to tilt power away from small producers in global chains producing agricultural 
products, where the traditional connotation of the word “commodity” is less problematic. 
Work is also continuing on how labor (especially female labor) is utilized differentially in 
GVCs (Barrientos et al, 2003; Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004), and on the prospects for 
small firms, and clusters of small firms, to leverage GVCs for industrial upgrading 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2003; Schmitz, 2004).  Rafael Kaplinsky and his co-authors have 
examined determinants of upgrading and measurement issues in a variety of industries in an 
effort to understand how rents are distributed and appropriated in GVCs (Kaplinsky et al, 
2002; Kaplinsky, 2005, 2006). 
 
Despite differences in terminology and emphasis, recent scholarship on ‘global production 
networks’ (Henderson et al, 2002; Dicken, 2005, 2006; Yueng et al, 2006; Yueng, 
forthcoming), shares the GVC literature’s baseline assumption that various types of 
international, inter-firm networks have become central features of a wide range of 
contemporary industries, including agriculture, manufacturing, and services. In my view, the 
chain metaphor is simply a heuristic tool for focusing research on complex and dynamic 
global industries. It provides enough richness to ground our analysis of global industries, but 
not so much that the analysis gets bogged down in excessive difference and variation, or is 
forced into overly narrow spatial, analytic, or sectoral frames in response to the 
overwhelming complexity and variation that researchers inevitably encounter in the field. 
While debates over the relative merits of terms and metaphors, such as global commodity 
chains, global value chains, global production networks, and chain governance will certainly 
continue, it is safe to say that this work shares a focus on the organizational and spatial 
                                                                                                                                                                        
7 I owe this observation to conversations with Jennifer Bair, Stefano Ponte, Peter Gibbon, and Florence 
Palpacuer. 
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structure and dynamics of industries, the strategies and behavior of major firms and their 
suppliers, and the need to identify scalable conceptual tools that help researchers move easily 
from local to global levels of analysis.  These commonalities, in my view, define a core 
research agenda that cuts across these chain and network paradigms. 
 
If theory building is best pursued in a segmented fashion, what are the main areas that 
deserve attention? A thoughtful and comprehensive list developed by Henderson et al (2002: 
447) includes the spatial organization of firm-level networks, power-in-the-chain, 
institutions, labor, and the determinants of value capture.  Going back to Gereffi’s (1994) 
fourfold framework of input-output, geography, governance, and institutions, we can 
summarize recent progress, at least in part, as follows. The first two elements of Gereffi’s 
framework, input-output and geography, are descriptive.  They provide GVC researchers 
with their initial marching orders: to map the organizational and spatial division of labor in 
the chain that is under examination.  This will inevitably include an overlapping set of 
discrete value chain activities contained within, or spread across organizations and locations.  
This is an extremely useful starting point for asking questions about the dynamic economic 
geography of industries.8   
 
The last two elements of Gereffi’s framework, governance and institutions, are causal.  They 
contain explanations for observed organizational and spatial features of GVCs, and highlight 
the forces external to the chain that structure (enable and limit) what actors in the chain do.  
The notion of “drivenness” contained in Gereffi’s original framework usefully focuses 
attention on power in the chain.  Even if clear distinctions between buyers and producers, or 
the association of these forms with specific industries, have been superceded by events, the 
identification of powerful actors in the chain, and an examination of the sources of this power 
and the ways that it is used, remains a central project of GVC theory-building.  
                                                      
8 In fact, an accurate mapping of the chain can be all that is needed for activists and policy makers to identify 
leverage points for affecting change.  For example, in this volume Schurman and Munro show how “anti-
biotech” activists were able to usher in a multiyear moratorium on new genetically modified (GMO) food crop 
approvals in Europe by focusing pressure on the region’s tenth-largest food retailer.  When this firm increased 
its market share by labeling its stores “GMO free,” its larger competitors soon followed suit.  
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If we split Gereffi’s category of “governance” into two distinct areas of inquiry, 
power and the determinants of firm-level coordination, and include institutions as a third 
category, we are left with three “pillars” of GVC analysis, broadly defined: 1) the character 
of linkages between tasks, or stages, in the chain of value added activities (explained in part 
by a theory of GVC governance); 2) how power is distributed and exerted among firms and 
other actors in the chain; and 3) the role that institutions play in structuring business 
relationships and industrial location.  These three elements, individually and even more so in 
combination, can contribute to robust explanations of why observed inter-firm relationships 
and geographic patterns have evolved in an industry, or part of an industry, and even provide 
insight into how they might evolve in the future.  Since I have already summarized the GVC 
governance framework, I will touch briefly on power and institutions in the remainder of this 
section. 
Power in the Chain  
As Perrow (1981) argues, power is an integral part of economic life.  The effects of power, or 
lack of power, can be discerned at every level of analysis. Institutional actors, including 
states and multi-lateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), shape 
GVCs through the enforcement, or lack of enforcement, of laws and the terms of 
international agreements.  Consumers have power through the purchasing choices they make, 
when they turn the products and services they buy to unintended purposes (Leslie and 
Reimer, 1999), and even more so, when their wishes are amplified by advocacy groups and 
through class action litigation.  Workers also have power, especially when they are 
represented by labor unions with the ability to call work stoppages at the level of the 
enterprise, industry, or broader economy. 
 
At the firm level, power is accumulated, held, and wielded in different ways and in different 
amounts by various actors in the chain.  GVC analysis commonly divides an industry into 
two broad types of firms: lead firms and suppliers.  Lead firms, at the very least, set product 
strategy, place orders, and take financial responsibility for the goods and services that their 
supply chains churn out.  As Gereffi envisioned, lead firms can be buyers, with little or no 
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production of their own, or producers.  Lead firms, because they have the agency (within 
limits) to choose and replace suppliers, wield purchasing power.  Although it is not always 
exercised, purchasing power allows a lead firm to explicitly coordinate the activities of its 
supply chain and to pressure suppliers to lower costs, increase quality, adopt specific 
equipment, employ specific business processes, purchase inputs from specific vendors, and 
invest in specific locations.   
 
A second category of firm-level power in GVCs is supplier power.  Extreme forms of 
supplier power have been variously refereed to as “platform leadership” (Gower and 
Cusumano, 2002) and “Wintelism” (Borrus and Zysman, 1997).  Market and technological 
dominance affords platform leaders the power to set standards. True platform leadership in 
the supply-base is rare, but there are notable examples where suppliers either dominate the 
chain, or share power with lead firms, forming what Fold (2002) calls “bi-polar” GVCs.9 
Supplier power based on platform leadership, even if it is extremely strong, is typically not 
associated with explicit coordination of buyers or other “downstream” value chain actors.  
For example, Intel issues several thick specification books with each of its new 
microprocessors that allow its customers to incorporate Intel semiconductors in their product 
designs.  But Intel does not dictate where those final products will be made, in what number, 
or among which firms work will be divided. 
 
More typical is a softer form of supplier power, competence power, stemming from technical 
and service capabilities that are difficult to replace (Penrose, 1959; Palpacuer, 2000). 
Suppliers wield competence power when their products and services are seen as nearly 
indispensable for the lead firms they serve.  Lead firms can use their purchasing power to 
place limits on supplier power, often with a large measure of success, since even the most 
                                                      
9 To the well-known cases of the structuring role that Intel microprocessors and Microsoft’s operating system 
play in personal computer industry (Borrus and Zysman, 1997) and that Shimano’s component systems play in 
the bicycle industry (Galvin and Morkel, 2001), I can add several others, including Applied Materials’ 
manufacturing equipment in the semiconductor and flat panel display industries (Murtha, Lenway, and Hart, 
2001), Qualcomm’s chip sets for mobile phone technologies based on CDMA technologies, ARM’s chip 
technology for mobile phone systems based on the GSM standard, and grinders in the coffee industry (Fold, 
2002). 
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competent and important suppliers base their success on winning future orders.  Retaining the 
ability to switch suppliers, even among a very small group of two to four, appears to be 
adequate in most instances to keep supply power in check.10 
 
While it is tempting to refer to platform leaders as “lead firms,” since even their customers 
have to accommodate to the standards they set, it is analytically useful to retain the 
distinction between lead firms and suppliers that are platform leaders, since the power that 
accrues to lead firms from placing orders (purchasing power) has a source (risk taking) that is 
distinct from the extreme technological competence required to set industry-level standards. 
 
While an examination of power in GVCs is a distinct realm of analysis, a point of overlap 
with GVC governance theory relates to the relative power of firm-level actors in the chain. In 
modular value chains, suppliers take responsibility for their bundle of activities (e.g., 
purchasing, process development, production, etc.), and while their largest customers 
typically monitor them closely, the fact that their capacity is easily switched to other 
customers provides them with more freedom of action than suppliers that are more deeply 
embedded with their customers.  When supplier capacity is generic, suppliers can and do 
spread risk across a large and diverse pool of buyers.  In relational value chains, the tacit 
knowledge that suppliers bring to the table provides them with some leverage, but the thick 
linkages they must forge with buyers may be hard to replicate with other buyers in time to 
avoid severe hardship.  If we view the power conferred on lead firms by their buying role as 
decisive, over time, this lock-in with customers creates a higher level of power asymmetry in 
GVCs with a high concentration of relational linkages than in GVCs with many modular and 
market linkages.  Of course, as transaction costs theory stresses, the opposite scenario is also 
possible, where relational linkages, asset specificity, and the deep competencies of suppliers 
make it all but impossible for lead firms to replace them. The key point is that asset 
                                                      
10 Of course, all forms of firm-level power are related in some way to simple market power, and the notion that 
industry concentration is, to some degree, compatible with competition is quite venerable (Chamberlin, 
1933:205). 
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specificity can shift power toward either party in the transaction.  How these dynamics play 
out in specific situations is a central question of GVC research. 
Institutions 
Institutions have been conceived of very broadly.  On one side of the spectrum, we can think 
of institutions as bureaucratic organizations with payrolls and physical addresses, including 
government agencies and non-governmental organizations, such as multilateral agencies, 
industry trade groups, labor unions, and advocacy groups.  On the other side, we can think of 
institutions as the rules that govern society, either bureaucratically, as codified in legal 
cannons and regulatory systems, or existing more amorphously, though perhaps no less 
powerfully, in the realm of societal norms and expectations (North, 1990).  Firms and 
industries clearly adapt in response to institutional pressures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  By 
setting the rules that firms must operate within, “institutions…[shape] the creation and 
functions of units in market and the relations between them” (Stinchcombe, 1977: p. 2).  The 
rules set by institutions are derived, to a greater or lesser degree, by the beliefs, values, 
meanings, and priorities embedded in the societies that create them, fund them, and staff 
them. As a result, limits are placed on actions, and firms or managers that surpass those 
limits run the risk of sanction, creating pressure for firms to operate according to the norms 
and expectations of the societies in which they operate (Yeung, forthcoming).  
 
The impact of institutions on the geography and character of GVCs can be profound, as Bair 
(2005) stresses. For example, the enlargement of the European Union, the establishment of 
the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), and China’s accession to the WTO, have 
had a large effect on economic geography of many industries, including the location of direct 
investment and the relationship between production systems and their target markets (Bair 
and Gereffi, 2001; Bair, 2002). At the firm-level, routines of interaction between suppliers 
and lead firms can be deeply rooted in domestic and even local institutions and culture, and 
often structure (enable or limit) firm-level GVC governance in an ongoing manner (Sturgeon, 
2007).  Because industries have developed within different institutional contexts, for example 
in Europe, Japan, and North America, it is not surprising that firms and industries respond to 
common pressures differently at home (Helper, 1991).  It is more surprising, perhaps, that 
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these specificities continue to exert influence even as the largest firms have developed global 
operational footprints (Berger, 2005).  
 
Again, there are major points of intersection between the three pillars of GVC-related theory.  
For example, the increasingly stringent standards (e.g. for product quality and consumer 
protection) and competitive differentiation in previously undifferentiated product categories, 
such as fresh fruit and vegetables, introduced new levels of explicit coordination (via 
modular linkages and vertical integration) in horticultural GVCs that had previously been 
market based (Dolan and Humphrey, 2000).  Another example has to do with the standards 
for exchanging information, limiting behavior, and insuring quality in GVCs.  Creating such 
institutions, or “conventions,” is almost always a contentious process (Ponte and Gibbon, 
2005) with outcomes clearly related to power in the chain.  Countries with large markets, 
such as China, can more easily set local content rules than smaller countries.  Firms with a 
large market share or an unassailable technological advantage have the power to set 
standards and requirements for other value chain actors.  For example, the process of 
developing industry-level codification schemes needed to support value chain modularity can 
be blocked in industries where power is concentrated in a handful of huge lead firms, such as 
the automotive and commercial aircraft industries (Sturgeon et al, 2007; Kimura, 2007). 
Conclusions 
Because the stakes are so high, we must take global integration seriously, and develop ways 
of thinking that place novel and emergent features of the global economy in the foreground. 
In simpler times it made sense to focus on the roles of comparative advantage and the 
market- and capability-seeking activities of multinational corporations in motivating and 
structuring international trade and investment. While these concepts have proved to be 
extremely robust and are still valuable, they do not emphasize the fragmentation of the value 
chain or the fluid, real-time integration of capabilities in advanced economies with the 
rapidly rising capabilities in places that were all but outside of the capitalist global economy 
only two decades ago, such as China, India, Russia, and Vietnam. In fact, they emphasize the 
opposite: national export specialization in undifferentiated commodities, on one hand, and 
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finished products, on the other, and the extension of existing national advantage, via 
multinational affiliates, to places where industrial capabilities lag far behind.  While the rise 
of GVCs do not render this view of global competition completely anachronistic, it is safe to 
say that the picture has grown much more complex.  
 
In an attempt to bring some order to this complexity, the GVC governance framework 
revisits the terrain between markets and hierarchies, exploding the network form into three 
distinct modes of inter-firm governance: modular, relational, and captive.  The framework 
identifies the problem of asset specificity as an important, but not sole or unidirectional 
driver of firm-level decision-making, and elevates three variables that dynamically shape the 
content and character of inter-firm linkages: complexity, codifiability, and supplier 
competence. The focus is not only on the organizational patterns and power dynamics that 
are generated by different variable combinations, but also on the geographic possibilities 
(e.g., clustering vs. dispersal of industries, rapid vs. gradual relocation of work) that are 
enabled by each governance form.  
 
As a theory of linkages, the GVC governance framework is not intended to provide a 
complete theory of economic development, but a transaction-, firm- and industry-centric 
theory of governance among the firm- and establishment-level actors in the chain.  As such it 
cannot provide a full accounting of the characteristics and consequences of GVCs.  It can, 
however, provide a bottom-up, research-driven method that accounts for the governance 
characteristics that tend to arise in global value chains absent other factor and influences.  As 
Peter Doeringer has suggested,11 if the pattern of global value chain governance in an 
industry does not fit the theory, then an alternative force, such as a strong institutional 
mechanism or an extremely concentrated industry structure, is likely to be at work.  In this 
way, GVC governance theory can provide researchers with a relatively simple set of baseline 
research questions and policy-makers with a first-pass tool for analysis.  Moreover, the larger 
                                                      
11 These remarks were made at the conference “Organisational Configurations and Locational Choices of Firms: 
Responses to Globalisation in Different Industry and Institutional Environments. Centre for Research in the 
Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, Cambridge University, Cambridge UK, on April 14, 2005. 
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GVC framework can provide a neutral conceptual space for comparing research results 
across industries and geography.   
 
Our goal in developing a theory of GVC governance was to tidy up a relatively small corner 
of the theoretical room, with the hope that others would accept — and work to improve — 
our solution, and go on to build compatible frameworks dealing with other aspects of 
globalization. This theoretical partitioning is especially important if the goal is to develop 
dynamic frameworks that can predict and account for change because with moving parts, 
complexity increases.  Together with the shaping power that institutions have on an 
industry’s organization and geography, and the various forms of power that are exerted 
among firms and at the industry level, we can use GVC governance theory to begin to 
develop a relatively comprehensive view of the forces driving change in the organization and 
economic geography of specific sectors.  But more work remains to be done, not only in the 
realm of power and institutions, but also in the more pragmatic and policy-oriented areas of 
GVC metrics, industrial upgrading, and work organization.   
 
While it is important to develop various aspects of GVCs as distinct theoretical realms, it is 
equally important to actively nurture points of intersection.  For example, the variables of 
complexity, codifiability, and competence all have powerful influence at the intersection of 
work organization and technological change (Levy and Murnane, 2004).  How the influence 
of social and spatial proximity plays out in the face of ongoing efforts to codify complex 
information and knowledge will not only help to determine the prevalence of the relational 
and modular GVC governance forms, but also the prospects for location-specific industrial 
agglomerations (Scott, 2006), systems of innovation (Lundvall, 1992; Lundvall et al 2002), 
and varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In an age of globalization, theory 
building needs to be approached in an additive, modular fashion, with an eye toward 
compatibility with methods and frameworks that both broaden the scope of analysis and add 
detail in specific areas. In this way, the multiple streams of GVC-related theory can be built 
into a broad, cohesive framework for understanding global industries and responding to the 
risks and opportunities they pose. 
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It is important to bear in mind how nascent this theory-building project remains. Julia Lane 
has likened the current state of qualitative industry research to the study of the natural world 
in the 16th and 17th centuries.12 In this era, curious researchers made detailed notes and 
drawings of what they could see of the vastness and variety around them, but there were few 
mechanisms for compiling the findings of individual researchers into larger pools of 
knowledge that could reveal broad patterns. Comparison of results came haphazardly with 
personal communication between scholars and in the few forums, such as the British Royal 
Society, where research could be presented and results debated and compared. In this way 
classification systems gradually came into being and some of the mechanisms at work in 
nature were revealed.  
 
Similarly, scholars of global industries have now had several decades to present, publish, and 
debate their research results. These findings show that the process of global integration is 
expressed differently in different industries and places. The precise patterns and effects of 
global integration depend in some large part on the technical and business characteristics that 
prevail in specific industries, the relative power of firm and non-firm actors in the chain, and 
the social and institutional characteristics of the places in which the tendrils of GVCs are 
embedded.  While field research on industry-specific GVCs remains as important as ever, the 
accumulation of case studies has created the conditions needed for the development of 
generic, industry-neutral theories to explain observed patterns and to predict outcomes 
associated with them.  More effort is shifting to the construction of classification schemes 
and conceptual models that can stand in for the mechanisms that work to create the variety 
observed in the field.  Yet we remain very close to the starting line.  The field of GVC-
related theory building is wide open. 
 
                                                      
12  These remarks were made at the MIT Working Group on Services Offshoring Workshop, held in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts on October 28, 2005. 
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